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RESPONSE ARTICLE
David Foster Wallace and New Sincerity 
Aesthetics: A Reply to Edward Jackson 
and Joel Nicholson-Roberts
Adam Kelly
University of York, GB 
adam.kelly@york.ac.uk
This essay responds to the critique of my work advanced by Edward  Jackson 
DQG -RHO 1LFKROVRQ5REHUWV LQ ې:KLWH *X\V 4XHVWLRQLQJb ,Q1謀nLWH -HVWs 
1HZ6LQFHULW\ۑSXEOLVKHGLQbOrbitbLQ0DUFK,QDGGLWLRQWRUHIXWLQJ
WKHLUPLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIP\ZRUN,SURYLGHDSRVLWLYHUHDUWLFXODWLRQ
of my core reading of the New Sincerity aesthetic, outlining its connec-
WLRQWRFRQFHSWVVXFKDVD1言eFWLQWHQWLRQXQGHFLGDELOLW\OLWHUDWXUHDQG
 neoliberalism.
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In the nearly nine years since David Foster Wallaces death in September 2008, 
interest in his work has steadily increased. The period has witnessed a series of 
cultural and critical milestones: the posthumous publication of a Wallace novel, a 
book of non-fiction, a commencement speech, and an undergraduate philosophy 
thesis; a best-selling biography, three books of interviews, a number of dramatic 
performances, and two movies; multiple academic conferences, monographs, edited 
essay collections and journal articles; the opening of an archive, the establishment of 
an international society and a journal devoted solely to Wallaces work. Amid this rush 
to canonise such a relatively contemporary authorthere is no comparable figure of 
Wallaces generation or younger whose writing has received such critical and popular 
attentionit is no surprise that voices have been raised querying the process. As early 
as 2011, the phrase Wallace backlash was being employed in online publications 
(Giardina 2011, Warnica 2011) in response to articles criticising Wallaces writing and 
literary influence that had begun to appear in mainstream outlets including Prospect 
Magazine and The New York Times (Dyer 2011, Newton 2011). In the wave of responses 
that followed the release of the biographical film The End of the Tour in 2015, some 
commentators turned their ire on the Wallace Industry for an alleged hijacking 
of Wallaces reception and public image (Shechtman 2015, Lorentzen 2015). More 
recently still, these two themes have sometimes combined in feminist commentary 
that connects the perceived maleness of Wallaces writing with the makeup of his 
readership and his place within a broader patriarchal culture (Fischer 2015, Coyle 
2017, Crispin 2017).
Within the academic reception of Wallaces work, such a critical turn has taken 
longer to develop, but it has recently become a notable phenomenon. It appears 
to have been generated by two coalescing trends. As Wallace has entered into the 
mainstream of American literary culture, his writing has come to the attention of 
established scholars in the field (and in related fields), not all of whom have been 
impressed by what they see (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011, McGurl 2014, Hungerford 2016). 
Meanwhile, a younger generation of critics, whose graduate studies were under-
taken in a milieu already steeped in Wallaces influence, have begun to question 
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elements of his work that have come to seem problematic from a political point of 
view (Williams 2015, Hayes-Brady 2016, Thompson 2017). While it has been interest-
ing to see arguments about the Wallace Industry occasionally migrate from the 
broader culture into the assessments of academicsmost notably in Mark McGurls 
diagnosis of Wallaces readership in the Infinite Summer project (2014: 4143) and 
Amy Hungerfords complaint that )NÂNITE *ESTs success owes more to clever mar-
keting than to genuine literary merit (2016: 15859)it has been unusual to see 
specific individuals other than Wallace himself be held accountable for his commer-
cial and critical prominence. Most of the recent scholarly critiques of Wallace have 
been directed squarely at his own writing, rather than at those who have offered 
prior readings of it. While interpretative disagreements have certainly emerged, it 
has been rare to see one scholar of Wallace being forcefully called out by another for 
what s/he has put into print.
Against this background, it was more than a little disconcerting to encounter 
the charges levelled against me and my work by Edward Jackson and Joel Nicholson-
Roberts in White Guys: Questioning )NÂNITE*ESTs New Sincerity, published by Orbit 
in March of this year. Reading the abstract to this article, I learned that I am a pro-
ponent of an elitist understanding of the literary text, that I misconstrue Jacques 
Derridas notion of iterability and undecidability, that my work supports forms of 
racist and sexist exclusion, that my reading works to restore white men to positions 
of representative cultural authority (2017: 1). Continuing on through the piece, I 
found myself taken to task for additional sins: my treatment of affect, my alleged 
disdain for popular culture, my formalism. The first half of Jackson and Nicholson-
Robertss article consists of a reading of my 2010 essay David Foster Wallace and 
the New Sincerity in American Fiction, with some glancing references to work Ive 
published since that essay appeared. The second half marshals this reading in the 
service of a critique of the racial politics of )NÂNITE *EST. Throughout, the authors 
target appears to be a dual one: their sights are trained both on Wallace himself and 
on a critic whose influential reading is taken (rightly or wrongly) to be celebrating 
Wallaces writing (2017: 1).
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When the initial shock of confronting such an aggressive attack on my work 
began to abate, the question of how best to respond necessarily raised itself. The 
issue of how Wallaces fiction represents and handles racial and sexual difference 
is clearly a serious and important one, and it is a subject that has been taken up 
sensitively by a number of scholars (Fitzpatrick 2006, McGurl 2014, Morrissey and 
Thompson 2014, Araya 2015, Cohen 2015, Hayes-Brady 2016, Thompson 2017). In 
my current book project I devote individual chapters to the complex relationship 
between New Sincerity aesthetics and questions of gender and race, and had I the 
space here to respond fully to all aspects of Jackson and Nicholson-Robertss article 
I would explain why their approach to this political subject matterwhich involves 
employing categories drawn from Denise Ferreira da Silvas Toward a Global Theory 
of Raceseems to me less persuasive than approaches that emphasise historical and 
cultural context (e.g. Cohen 2015), style and genre (McGurl 2014), or archival research 
(Thompson 2017). In working on this response, however, I have found it impossible 
to approach these broader political questions without first addressing the specific 
technical and theoretical claims made by the articles authors about my work on New 
Sincerity. Since Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts have elected to premise their critique 
of )NÂNITE*EST s racial and gender politics over the second half of their article on a 
reading of my work over the first half, it seems appropriate that my attention be 
directed to the part of their essay in which the key claims against my writing are 
made. In what follows, therefore, I have put the direct critique of Wallace to one 
side, and focused on correcting what I see as the articles misrepresentations of my 
argument. In doing so, I have also taken the opportunity to re-articulate the core ideas 
of my position in positive form. Because the authors overlook so much of what I have 
published on New Sincerity in the years since 2010, I have found it necessary in this 
response to cite my own work far more frequently than I would normally consider 
doing. I hope that, in the circumstances, the reader will forgive such an approach.
$ᒊHFW,QWHQWLRQ3HUIRUPDQFH
My first qualms with Jackson and Nicholson-Robertss article emerge as early as its 
opening sentence. Here and throughout, the authors mobilise the term affect in a 
specific and symptomatic way. The reader is informed that in my early overview of 
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Wallace studies as an emerging field (Kelly 2010b), I argued that an essay by A. O. 
Scott helped engender the common understanding of Wallaces work as an attempt 
to renew sincere affect in the face of postmodern affectlessness (2017: 2). How-
ever, the notion of postmodern affectlessness (or further down the authors first 
paragraph, affectless self-consciousness) is nowhere to be found in my writing. 
This is an exemplary case of something that happens more widely in Jackson and 
Nicholson-Robertss article, where they conflate my account of New Sincerity with 
claims made by Wallace, particularly in his non-fiction but also in some of the more 
seemingly didactic passages of )NÂNITE*EST. It may appear as if, in Wallaces descrip-
tion of irony in E Unibus Pluram or his depiction of Hal in )NÂNITE*EST, the primary 
target of his fiction is postmodern affectlessness, but even if one can argue that (and 
I think its a dubious argument), this is not for me the focus of New Sincerity writing. 
As I have argued in many places, New Sincerity primarily names an aesthetic response 
by a generation of novelists to the challenge to older forms of expressive subjectiv-
ity that coalesced in the period during which they began writing.1 In the original 
essay the authors discuss (Kelly 2010a), I focused on two contexts for understanding 
this challenge: the impact of theory (specifically Derridas theory of general writ-
ing) and the rise of advertising to central prominence in Western, and particularly 
American, culture. In work published since then, I have expanded this dual focus 
to enumerate and explore further contexts for understanding New Sincerity writ-
ing, contexts that are variously intellectual, institutional, technological, political and 
aesthetic.2 Rather than postmodernism, which has been the most prominent term 
used by critics to historicise the fiction of Wallaces generation of writers, the term 
that I now think best encompasses all of these contexts is neoliberalism: hence the 
title of my monograph-in-progress, American Fiction at the Millennium: Neoliberalism 
and the New Sincerity.
What I have never implied in any of this work is that the self-consciousness 
dramatised and explored so thoroughly in Wallaces fiction is somehow affectless: 
 1 Expressive subjectivity is not a term I will treat in detail here: I define it in Kelly 2014 and explore it 
further in Kelly 2017a.
 2 Some of these contexts are enumerated and briefly sketched in Kelly 2016.
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rather the opposite. By highlighting the intersubjective and social consequences of 
the historical situation he saw facing his generation, Wallace was led, I argue, to 
place great emphasis on the trope of sincerity, which Ernst van Alphen and Mieke 
Bal helpfully describe as an indispensable affective (hence, social) process between 
subjects (2009: 5, emphasis in original). But this turn to sincerity is not a renewal 
of affect from a non-affective state: my work is not premised, as Jackson and 
Nicholson-Roberts suggest, on an unexamined binary of sincere affect versus affect-
less irony (2017: 8). Rather, subjects in Wallaces fiction are depicted as what we 
might call originally affected: they enter the world not as the autonomous and free 
subjects imagined by many traditions of philosophical and political liberalism, but 
as always already in a highly affective relation to themselves, to others, and to the 
conditions of their world. If they go on to perform an affectless pose, this is only as 
a pre-emptive defence against being further affected. I therefore agree fully with the 
line the authors quote from David Randos 2013 article  that affectless irony can be 
described as a product of emotion, specifically the emotions of anxiety or fear about 
emotional vulnerability itself (qtd. 2017: 8)  but would point out that it has a pre-
cursor in this passage from my 2010 New Sincerity essay:
David Foster Wallaces fiction, in contrast, asks what happens when the 
anticipation of others reception of ones outward behaviour begins to take 
priority for the acting self, so that inner states lose their originating causal 
status and instead become effects of that anticipatory logic. Former divisions 
between self and other morph into conflicts within the self, and a recursive 
and paranoid cycle of endless anticipation begins, putting in doubt the very 
referents of terms like self and other, inner and outer. (2010a: 136)
Perhaps I dont make fully explicit here that this recursive and paranoid cycle 
of endless anticipation is an affective and emotional experience, as much as it is a 
structural outcome of life in a neoliberal order. But in a 2012 article I refer to what I 
call the anxiety of anticipation that Wallace appends to the Dostoevskian dialogic 
model he otherwise relies heavily upon. Wallace adds an extra element to the mix, 
I write, which rests in the anticipatory anxiety his characters feel when addressing 
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others. Speakers in Wallaces fiction are often depicted as desperate for genuine 
reciprocal dialogue, but find that their overwhelming need to predict in advance the 
others response blocks the possibility of finding the language to get outside them-
selves and truly reach out to the other (2012a: 27071).
While I hope these quotations make my point, I would also say that one rea-
son for leaving relatively implicit a discussion of affect in passages such as these 
is that I have always been wary of reducing Wallaces literary intervention to his 
depiction of psychological or bodily states. Individual psychology is evidently a big 
part of his focus as a writer, but in my view an overemphasis on this aspect of his 
work risks overlooking other dimensions of his engagement with contemporary life, 
dimensions through which we might more clearly begin to derive a politics from the 
New Sincerity aesthetic. I have placed particular emphasis, in this regard, on reading 
Wallaces fiction in relation to van Alphen and Bals call for a new theorization of 
sincerity, one that can rethink sinceritys rhetorical basis outside of its bond with 
subjectivity (2009: 5) (or, as we might put it more precisely by importing the lan-
guage of Lionel Trilling, outside of its bond with a certain conception of subjective 
authenticity). Van Alphen and Bal stress the formidable influence of a present-day 
media-sphere in which performance overrules expression (2009: 5), and it is pre-
cisely this shift from expression to performance that Wallace sees as both a threat to 
sincerity but also its condition of possibility in a new form. As I argue in my 2014 
Dialectic of Sincerity essay, the epitome of this shift from expression to perfor-
mance is the AA model in )NÂNITE*EST.
Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts are broadly right to suggest, therefore, that on 
my reading of Wallace, Performativity, then, is all there is (2017: 5). Performativity 
is indeed the vehicle through which Wallace enacts his vision thatto quote the 
title of a course taught at Enfield Tennis Academythe personal is the political is 
the psychopathological (1997: 307). But the claim that the authors twin with this 
insight about performativity, that in my reading of Wallace there is no intentional 
subject either to know or to be known (2017: 5), is a simplification of my argument 
about the role of intention in New Sincerity fiction. In order to explain why Wallace 
and his generational colleagues might be searching for a form of sincerity that does 
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not reinstitute a traditional notion of expressive, authentic subjectivity, I have found 
it useful to reconstruct an implicit distinction made in )NÂNITE*EST between intent 
and motive. These two poles of the broader category of intentional subjectivity 
capture concisely the problem Wallace saw with the version of the subject prevalent 
in his own time. On the one hand, there can be no sense of human agency with-
out intent: this is the horror that lies behind the description of the eyes of those 
subjects who have viewed the Infinite Jest film as Empty of intent (1997: 508). 
Intent here names something like the minimal orientation towards the world 
presumed by phenomenology; it is a correlative of being originally affected. The 
victims of the film have lost intent and become affectless  in that they no longer 
respond to stimuli as brutal as having their fingers forcibly removed  only because 
they have been affected to a truly terrifying extent. On the other hand, Wallaces 
narrator employs the term motive  in phrases like sincerity with a motive (1997: 
1048)  to suggest a form of intention that sets out to manipulate the other in the 
service of self-interest. For Wallace the problem of resisting this form of intention 
 of identifying intent without motive  was less a conceptual conundrum than a 
historical one: the central anxiety his fiction performs and interrogates is that all 
relations towards the other exhibit only motive, that all characters (including the 
author himself) are no more than neoliberal entrepreneurs of the self. As we shall 
see more fully in my conclusion to this response, in Wallace and other New Sincerity 
writers this worry about motive leads them, in their representation of key characters 
and in the rhetoric of their narrative voice, to perform the negation of conscious 
intention altogether. This aesthetic negation of intentionwhich often doubles as a 
direct appeal to the reader to fill the gap left by this negationis what makes sincer-
ity impossible while simultaneously marking the possibility of its renewal.
This language of possibility and impossibility moves us inescapably into 
Derridean territory, which is where the thinking of New Sincerity began for me.3 But 
 3 As Jeffrey Severs notes in a careful engagement with my work in his excellent recent book on Wallace, my 
2010 essay undertakes its analysis by [d]escribing )NÂNITE*EST and parts of Brief Interviews in the language 
of double binds that populates both texts (2017: 120). In much of my subsequent writing on New Sincerity 
I have moved away from Derridean terminology, preferring a less technical and specialist vocabulary where 
Kelly: David Foster Wallace and New Sincerity Aesthetics 9 
before fully embracing this move, it is worth observing that Wallace was hardly alone 
in his historical moment in taking up the trope of performativity against a perceived 
cultural overemphasis on the authenticity of the expressive, intentional subject. 
Around the same time, many radical theorists of gender were doing much the same 
thing. Judith Butler is perhaps the most celebrated exponent of an argument that 
places performativity at its centre, identifying in the repetition of acts both the natu-
ralisation of oppressive gender norms and the means of subverting those norms. In 
)NÂNITE*EST, Wallaces vision seems less politically optimistic than the early Butlers, 
in that the performative horizon for AA subjects is not the overturning of sociopo-
litical structures that oppress them but simply the possibility of surviving from day 
to day under those structures. Wallace therefore displays scepticism concerning the 
socially subversive or emancipatory qualities of performativity, and can be seen in 
this regard to share more with the humanist leanings of the later Butler. Wallaces 
New Sincerity aesthetic can also be compared fruitfully to the work of Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, and particularly her highly influential argument for reparative reading 
against paranoid reading (the earliest version of this argument was published in 
1996, the same year as )NÂNITE *EST). Wallaces fiction consistently dramatises the 
negative consequences of paranoid readinghow it leads to the kind of solipsistic 
loop Sedgwick identifiesalongside the difficulties that attend any move to repara-
tive reading. Indeed, it is particularly the way reparative reading can be mobilized 
and exploited by white males that is the central focus of Brief Interviews with Hideous 
Men. Throughout this collection, the hideous men being interviewed have an overtly 
paranoid relation to their own behaviour, interrogating what they have done in the 
past and are likely, on that basis, to continue doing in the future. Yet this self-analysis 
simply allows them to evade responsibility for their actions and turn a false power 
of decision over to the woman they address (often the silent interviewer Q.), asking 
for a reparative response.4 The move from paranoid to reparative reading is made 
possible. The present response re-articulates my arguments through a Derridean language  primarily 
because it is on this ground that Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts have chosen to critique my work.
 4 I deal in more detail with this narrative structure, and ask more generally whether and how we might 
read Brief Interviews as a feminist text, in Kelly 2017b.
Kelly: David Foster Wallace and New Sincerity Aesthetics10
particularly problematic in the final interview, B.I. #20, which concerns a female 
hitchhiker who tells the male interviewee a story of how she was raped and almost 
killed by a mulatto. Gender and race are clearly a big part of the subject matter 
for this story, and the interviewees attempts to mobilise the hitchhikers repara-
tive reading for his own reparationI knew she could. I knew I loved. End of story 
(1999: 318)are evidently meant to be read in a paranoid or suspicious manner by 
the reader. In her essay, Sedgwick argued that the traditional epistemological ques-
tion, Is a particular piece of knowledge true, and how can we know? should be dis-
placed by the questions, What does knowledge dothe pursuit of it, the having and 
exposing of it, the receiving-again of knowledge of what one already knows? How, 
in short, is knowledge performative, and how best does one move among its causes 
and effects? (2003: 124). This displacement is something that likewise occurs in 
Wallaces writing: it is where much of the ethical energy of his fiction resides.
In my original essay on New Sincerity, I made many of the above points about 
Wallaces relationship to the hermeneutics of suspicion (or paranoid reading) in 
connection with Derrida rather than Sedgwick (2010a: 138). This was largely because 
I preferred (rightly or wrongly) to stress the more theoretical side of Wallaces inno-
vations rather than the touching feeling side.5 My sense was that Wallace critics 
had mostly emphasised the latter, partly in recognition of the fact that Wallaces 
readers so clearly responded to his fiction in surprisingly personal ways despite its 
intellectual complications. These critics had therefore failed to focus clearly enough, 
to my mind, on explaining what was new in Wallaces treatment of sincerity, philo-
sophically but also aesthetically. My primary interest when it comes to Wallace has 
always been in how he creates his effects (and affects) through singular sentences 
and complex story structures, and what larger lessons we might draw from his aes-
thetic experiments for our understanding of literary form in the twenty-first cen-
tury. Each in their own way, his peers and inheritorsincluding figures like Dave 
Eggers, Jennifer Egan, Tom McCarthy, George Saunders, Colson Whitehead and 
 5 Lest there be any ambiguity, I am quoting here the title of Sedgwicks book containing the final ver-
sion of her essay.
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Zadie Smithhave responded both to the affective quality of his fiction and to its 
technical brilliance, and I dont think we can fully understand their work without 
reckoning with Wallaces impact on contemporary writing.
3RSXODU&XOWXUH/LWHUDWXUH,WHUDELOLW\
If we now return to Jackson and Nicholson-Robertss mischaracterisation of my read-
ing of Wallace as regenerating sincere affect in the face of unemotional affectless-
ness, we can see how this mischaracterisation leads directly onto their next charge 
against my work, which is the cultural elitism that motivates the New Sincerity 
(2017: 8). This cultural elitism has two related strands in their account: on the one 
hand my assumed disdain for popular culturethe irony Kelly misreads as affect-
less is also an irony that he associates with popular culture (2017: 8)and on the 
other hand my supposed overemphasis on the literary text as the key site for encoun-
tering the New Sincerity aesthetic.
In addressing the first of these strands, I deliberately place popular culture in 
quotation marks because Im not at all certain what Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts 
mean to signify in their use of the phrase. Early in their article, they contrast my 
cultural elitism with a popular postmodern irony that appears to be exemplified 
by advertising in particular (2017: 3). The phrase popular culture or pop culture 
comes up a few times over the next few pages, but each time it lacks positive con-
tent and seems only to name something Im taken to be averse to. Later in the essay 
there is some implication that Wallaces non-fictionas opposed to his fictioncould 
count as popular culture, but none of this is very clear. A good example of how 
the authors use their own lack of clarity to tar me as a cultural elitist comes at the 
top of page 6, where I am taken to be promoting a distinction between on the one 
hand, a pop culture irony that alienates the subject and, on the other hand, a liter-
ary irony that takes the death of the subject as a given. They go on immediately to 
reiterate that Kelly associates pop culture irony particularly with advertising, which 
makes it seem as if, since I am critical of advertising, I am critical of all pop culture. 
But given that I never use the term pop culture or popular culture in any of the 
work they cite, the assumption that my critique of advertising is a critique of popular 
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culture more generally is simply the authors invention. If its the case that Jackson 
and Nicholson-Roberts want to defend advertising as an exemplar of popular cul-
ture, adopting a once trendy but now dubious cultural studies approach that stresses 
the benign face of capitalism, then I would be comfortable lining myself up with 
the plethora of Marxists, from Horkheimer and Adorno onwards, whose critique of 
advertising as an enabler of the consumer society probably needs no glossing.
I would also point out that the phrase New Sincerity is itself drawn from what 
one could legitimately describe as popular culture. The authors acknowledge this 
in their first footnote: Kellys use of the term New Sincerity as the primary descrip-
tor of his reading of Wallace (and various other writers he considers to be writing in 
Wallaces wake) nonetheless situates it within this zeitgeist (2017: 2n1). I would put 
this slightly differently: my impulse to use the termcapital letters and allcame 
from my encounter with it in various online manifestations during the mid-to-late 
2000s. My sense then, as now, is that its application to Wallaces fiction could help 
to explain both why so many critics and commentators seem compelled to describe 
Wallace as sincere (or as caught up with the problem of sincerity), and how his fiction 
might relate to a broader interest in sincerity within contemporary culture. Rather 
than dismiss popular culture as a sea of misinformation, in other words, my instinct 
is to assume that popular memes arise for good reason, and that if enough people 
are talking about a phenomenon then that phenomenon must be at least partially 
valid as a description of something real.6 So while I am glad that the authors think 
my work represents the most thorough attempt to theorize how literary sincerity 
might operate in the aftermath of the purported death of the subject (2017: 2n1), 
my initial aims were in fact more modest. I simply wanted to take a term that seemed 
to be prevalent in contemporary culture, and give it some historical weight and con-
ceptual rigour. The positive response to my work in popular as well as academic 
 6 I feel the same way, incidentally, about the term neoliberalism, which is more ubiquitous today than 
New Sincerity ever was at its popular peak. Im aware that there are critics on the left who would like 
us to stop using a term that so often seems to be cited as the explanation for all contemporary ills, yet 
it seems to me more productive to take a term with popular valence and help to give it depth, rigour 
and clarity. With New Sincerity I had to do some necessary groundwork; with neoliberalism there 
are thankfully many other scholars leading the way.
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venues has therefore been a gratifying development for me, which would hardly be 
the case if I were a card-carrying cultural elitist.
But the charge of cultural elitism brought by Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts 
contains a more substantial element than is present in their vague references to 
popular culture. This element is tied to my supposed misunderstanding and misap-
plication of the work of Jacques Derrida. The authors are in some ways quite care-
ful in their reconstruction of my reading of Derrida. However, having outlined that 
reading in a mostly accurate way, they then attempt to correct my understanding of 
two key Derridean concepts, arguing that I corral the implications of iterability and 
undecidability within an elitist understanding of the literary text (2017: 1). For 
them, this serves illegitimately to tame the implications that Derridas work has for 
the formal boundaries [Kelly] seeks to uphold (2017: 9).
The claim the authors argument rests upon here, that the distinction I make 
between literary and non-literary contexts is inconsistent with Derridas notion of 
general writing, is simply wrong. There is nothing in the theory of general writing 
that prevents making such a distinction, as long as we do not cast it as a hard-and-
fast one, ignorant of institutional histories, social norms, and political projects. As 
is well known, Derrida himself set out to write a doctoral thesis on The Ideality of 
the Literary Object, and devoted a large number of essays to exploring the peculiar 
qualities of literary texts. A selection of these essays are collected in Acts of Literature, 
and in his introduction to that volume Derek Attridge quotes Derrida remarking in 
an interview that my first inclination wasnt really towards philosophy, but rather 
towards literature, no, towards something that literature accommodates more easily 
than philosophy (qtd. 1992a: 2). This something is best understood as a particular 
relationship between the singular and the general which is also the core of iterability, 
and which the texts we call literary enact in a particularly vivid way. So while, as 
Derrida writes in The Double Session (a text DT Max tells us Wallace reveled in 
while at Amherst [2012: 38]), there is no essence of literature, no truth of literature, 
no literary-being or being-literary of literature (1992a: 177), there is nonetheless a 
distinctive kind of reading that literature asks for. In Attridges helpful gloss, litera-
ture names a linguistic practice in which we habitually celebrate the unique, instead 
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of finding it a hindrance, in which we usually have little objection to the impos-
sibility of abstracting a detachable meaning or moral (1992a: 14). Moreover, this 
involves a particularly self-conscious performance of iterability by the literary text, 
which should be understood not as a static object but as an event: it does not pos-
sess a core of uniqueness that survives mutability, but rather a repeatable singularity 
that depends on an openness to new contexts and therefore on its difference each 
time it is repeated (1992a: 16).7
This eventness of literature is what I have in mind when I draw on Wallaces 
distinction between environment and tool. Iterability is an environmental 
condition of language that literary texts thematise in their eventness, in a way that 
complicates the clear route to meaning implied by the notion of a tool. Derrida 
alludes to the difficulty of using literature as a tool when he observes that poetry 
and literature have as a common feature that they suspend the thetic naivety of a 
transcendent reading (1992a: 45). In other words, when we read a literary text we 
know that we cannot simply move from the language on the page to some non-
linguistic referent. This feature is what gives literature its anomalous political status, 
what makes it a strange institution, since it simultaneously allows an author to 
say everything while having his/her words risk not being taken seriously for their 
referential force. In the end, the critico-political function of literature, in the West, 
remains very ambiguous, Derrida remarks. The freedom to say everything is a very 
powerful political weapon, but one which might immediately let itself be neutralized 
as a fiction (1992a: 38). As a result, Derrida stresses that the questioning force of 
literature must lie not so much in its propositional contentalthough this is clearly 
not irrelevantas in its form:
Sometimes this questioning occurs more effectively via the actual practice 
of writing, the staging, the composition, the treatment of language, rhetoric, 
than via speculative arguments. Sometimes theoretical arguments as such, 
even if they are in the form of critique, are less destabilizing, or lets just say 
alarming, for metaphysical assumptions than one or other way of writing. 
 7 For a fully developed account of literature as a singular event, see Attridges The Singularity of Literature.
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A work laden with obvious and canonical metaphysical theses can, in the 
operation of its writing, have more powerful deconstructive effects than a 
text proclaiming itself radically revolutionary without in any way affecting 
the norms or modes of traditional writing. (1992a: 50)
By emphasising Wallaces way of writing as the key to his New Sincerity aes-
thetic, I am not, as Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts claim, straightjacket[ing] the 
signs iterability as only applicable to literature (2017: 9). Like many other critics 
influenced by deconstruction, I find the signs iterability not to be solely applicable 
to literature but to be most interestingly explored by looking at what we call literary 
texts, and specifically at modern texts that, as Derrida puts it, all have in common that 
they are inscribed in a critical experience of literature (1992a: 41).8 But perhaps it is 
time to explain in more detail what I mean when, as Ive done many times already in 
this essay, I describe New Sincerity as an aesthetic. Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts 
would no doubt see this choice of term as another sign of my cultural elitism, so its 
worth pointing out that taking an interest in the specific character of the aesthetic 
hardly represents a marginal pursuit in literary criticism. One only has to glance at 
the key texts of Russian formalism, New Criticism, the Frankfurt School, as well as 
criticism influenced by deconstruction, to see that my engagement with the particu-
larity of literary and aesthetic contexts places my work squarely in the mainstream 
of literary-critical history. Perhaps in their defence of popular culture the authors 
would be willing to disdain many of these critical schools for their cultural elitism. 
But what would they do with the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, whose celebration of 
the carnivalesque in Rabelais and his World is one of the most famous anti-elitist 
 8 Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts claim in a footnote that my privileging of Wallaces fiction as the site 
of his New Sincerity aesthetic is inconsistent with my claim in another essay that Wallaces non-fic-
tion need not simply be read in the shadow of his fiction (Kelly 2010b, quoted Jackson and Nicholson 
Roberts 2017: 9n4). Whether deliberately or not, the authors have taken this quote out of context: 
what I go on to show in the sentence and paragraph in question is that Wallaces non-fiction has been 
receiving attention from scholars on its own terms and as a contribution to canons of non-fiction, i.e. 
not simply as a key to his fiction, or even in relation to that fiction. More broadly, I see no contradic-
tion between acknowledging the value and interest of Wallaces non-fiction and arguing that it can-
not explain everything that goes on in his fiction.
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arguments in the history of literary criticism, but who nonetheless thought that the 
novel represented a special case of discourse? Indeed, the dialogism and polyphony 
specific to the novel were precisely where the forms anti-elitism lay for Bakhtin, 
since the novel was a place where discourses could enter into dialogue with one 
another on a level plane, and a character could even, as Bakhtin argued in Problems of 
Dostoevskys Poetics, gain enough autonomy to challenge the all-knowing and poten-
tially tyrannical power of the author. This challenge to the authors dominance of the 
text is partly what I think Wallace appreciated in Dostoevsky; as Ill argue below, it is 
also how he came to conceive of the role of the reader in relation to his work.
Turning now more squarely to the question of the aesthetic in Wallace will allow 
me not only to clarify how New Sincerity aesthetics operate in the specific environ-
ment of the literary text, but also to address Jackson and Nicholson-Robertss critique 
of my application of another key Derridean term, undecidability. Undecidability is 
indeed central to New Sincerity writing as I interpret it, although not in the way the 
authors outline in their article. In the next section of this response, I will show how 
they misconstrue the role of undecidability in my work; this contributes to their mis-
understanding of the role I conceive for the reader of Wallaces texts, addressed in my 
final section. The misunderstandings in question then lead to the political charges 
the authors bring against New Sincerity writing and my account of it, charges I will 
not address directly here but which I plan to speak to in my future writing.
*LIW$HVWKHWLFV8QGHFLGDELOLW\6LQFHULW\
At the heart of Wallaces aesthetic practice lies the figure of the gift. His devotion 
to Lewis Hydes book The Gift is well known: a copy of the original 1983 text is one 
of the most marked-up books in his library at the Harry Ransom Center archive, 
and in a blurb written for the twenty-fifth-anniversary edition in 2007, Wallace 
claimed that No one who is invested in any kind of art, in questions of what real 
art does and doesnt have to do with money, spirituality, ego, love, ugliness, sales, 
politics, morality, marketing, and whatever you call value, can read The Gift and 
remain unchanged.9 To the already lengthy list in this sentence one could add 
 9 Excerpted on the book itself, this blurb (which is longer than I have quoted here), appears in full on 
Hydes website: http://www.lewishyde.com/publications/the-gift/comments-reviews.
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sincerity, which Wallace argued as a primary value of art in essays such as E 
Unibus Pluram and Joseph Franks Dostoevsky, and which he thematised con-
sistently in his fiction. Wallace can be understood to inherit this triangular rela-
tionship among art, gift, and sincerity directly from Hyde, in a process the latter 
describes in The Gift: The future artist finds himself or herself moved by a work 
of art, and, through that experience, comes to labor in the service of art until he 
can profess his own gifts (1983: 47). Here, The Gift would be the proto-artwork, 
teaching Wallace to labor in the service of art and of his own gifts. Significantly, 
Hyde distinguishes the term labor here from the term work. While work is 
something we do by the hour and if possible, we do it for money, labour repre-
sents an act of creation for its own sake, where time and money are far less central, 
and the ego is displaced: Things get done, but we often have the odd sense that 
we didnt do them (1983: 50).10 In his copy of the book, Wallace underlines this 
sentence, marks most of the passage it comes from, and circles the number at the 
top of the page, actions which indicate the special significance these arguments 
have for him.
Yet while throughout Hydes text the gift is understood to be something inher-
ently positive and even transformative, and while Wallaces private and public com-
mentary on the book seems to align him with this view, the latters fiction suggests a 
more complicated, more double-edged conception of the gift. For a start, it is a con-
ception much less sanguine about the separation of work (and pay) from the labour 
of creation. As Zadie Smith remarks in her incisive essay on Brief Interviews, In these 
stories, the act of giving is in crisis; the logic of the market seeps into every aspect of 
life (2009: 258). Take, for instance, the poet in Death is Not the End, who appears 
less interested in labouring to share his gifts than in accumulating recognition for 
those gifts through scholarships and prizes. Or take the screenwriter Ovid the Obtuse 
in Tri-Stan: I Sold Sissee Nar to Ecko, whose sole criterion is that he gets paid and 
who, when his screenplay is killed at the end of the story, suffers not a whit: Ovid the 
 10 Confusingly, this is something like the reverse of how the terms work and labor are used by 
Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition, a text that also resonates strongly throughout Wallaces 
writings, though there is less direct evidence for its influence on him.
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Obtuse ended up making out okay on the whole thing; dont you worry about Ovid 
(2000: 255). But while Wallace is clearly offering here examples of artist figures as 
comically cynical narcissists, this does not mean that it is necessarily straightforward 
to give a gift, nor for the artist to treat his/her work as one. Indeed, as Derrida argues, 
giving a gift may in fact be impossible.
In Given Time, his most extended treatment of the gift, Derrida asks whether a 
gift must be something that interrupts economy, whether [f]or there to be a gift, 
there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift, or debt (1992b: 7, 12). If 
we accept this premise, then any appearance of the gift must negate its ideal status, 
because recognising the gift as a gift already exposes it to a kind of exchange. Derrida 
explains this idea from the point of view of both the receiver and the giver of a gift. 
For the receiver, recognising a gift already implicates him/her in a debt relation: If 
he recognizes it as gift, if the gift appears to him as such, if the present is present to 
him as present, this simple recognition suffices to annul the gift. Why? Because it 
gives back, in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic equivalent (1992b: 
13). For the giver, likewise, the gift must not appear as a gift, otherwise he begins, 
at the threshold, as soon as he intends to give, to pay himself with a symbolic rec-
ognition, to praise himself, to approve of himself, to gratify himself, to congratulate 
himself, to give back to himself symbolically the value of what he thinks he has given 
or what he is preparing to give (1992b: 14). For these reasons, Derrida argues that 
[a]t the limit, the gift as gift ought not appear as gift: either to the donee or the donor 
(1992b: 14). In other words, the gift is impossible: it can only come into being by 
negating its ideal form. Furthermore, even the ideal form of the gift would be what 
Derrida calls undecidable: rather than inherently good, as it is for Hyde, for Derrida 
the good of the gift is inextricable from the harm it can do:
if giving is spontaneously evaluated as good (it is well and good to give and 
what one gives, the present, the cadeau, the gift, is a good), it remains the 
case that this good can easily be reversed. We know that as good, it can also 
be bad, poisonous (Gift, gift), and this from the moment the gift puts the 
other in debt, with the result that giving amounts to hurting, to doing harm. 
(1992b: 12)
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In Wallaces fiction, we can see the consequences of this joint impossibility and 
undecidability played out in a story such as The Devil is a Busy Man, again from 
Brief Interviews. Three weeks ago, I did a nice thing for someone, the story begins. 
I can not say more than this, or it will empty what I did of any of its true, ultimate 
value (2000: 190). Throughout this short text, the nameless narrator worries that 
revealing his identity as the giver of the gift would infect the motivation for my 
nice gesture, replacing his intended generosity with desiring gratitude, affection, 
and approval (2000: 190). As is typical of a Wallace story, this self-reflexive situation 
soon escalates vertiginously: the narrator finds that he wants desperately to be 
acknowledged as a good person (2000: 191) while still remaining anonymous; 
meanwhile the receiver of the gift alludes to it in a tone transmitting gratitude, 
approval, and something else (more specifically, something almost hostile, or 
embarrassed) (2000: 192). These emotions operate at an unconscious level in 
the interaction, governed by the undecidability Derrida outlines, with the gift 
simultaneously causing pleasure and pain, and revealing the inextricability of good 
and harm in the reactions of both giver and receiver. In the storys closing sentence, 
the narrator concludes that his attempts to be a good person have failed:
Thus, I showed an unconscious and, seemingly, natural, automatic ability to 
both deceive myself and other people, which, on the motivational level, 
not only completely emptied the generous thing I tried to do of any true 
value, and caused me to fail, again, in my attempts to sincerely be what 
someone would classify as truly a nice or good person, but, despairingly, 
cast me in a light to myself which could only be classified as dark, evil, or 
beyond hope of ever sincerely becoming good. (2000: 193)
This tortuous sentence is typical of how Wallace handles not only the gift, but 
also the trope of sincerity in his fiction. Employing a style that accentuates the cer-
ebral approach by the narrator to these ethical questionsthe many commas lend 
the effect of both hesitancy and pedantic precision to what is being said, echoing 
the can not in the storys second linethe sentence eventually converges on a 
double appearance of the term sincerely, the second of which occurs in quotation 
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marks. Trillings classic definition of sincerity as a congruence between avowal and 
actual feeling (1972: 3) is here undermined in a variety of ways, since the narrators 
actual feeling is shown to depend crucially on how he believes others will classify 
his behavior, while his avowal is complicated by his constant importation of scare 
quotes into his own analysis. These scare quotes evacuate words like nice, good, 
dark and evil of any stable ethical reference, while the quoted phrase beyond 
hope of ever sincerely becoming good displaces the speakers internal conscience 
onto the voice of the other, a kind of postmodern superego or Law of the Father. The 
speaker seems both to be suspicious of the ethical vocabulary he is employing and 
to need desperately to affirm it, while some of his quotationsfor instance moti-
vational leveleven suggest that he may be drawing his vocabulary from popular 
texts in self-help or business (one might think of Maslows motivational hierarchy of 
needs). The sincerity of the narrators use of all these terms becomes both an over-
riding consideration in reading the storyindeed, it is the storys central themeand, 
for structural reasons, something that is impossible to determine with certainty, for 
both the narrator himself and for the reader.
In their article, Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts question my invocation of 
undecidability in describing stories like the above. They appear to assume that my 
underlying purpose in highlighting moments of undecidability staged by Wallaces 
fiction is to validate the authors sincerity at a higher level, to make readers believe 
(in) him. Just as I apparently straightjacket the concept of iterability, here I 
introduce unwarranted proscriptions into the application of undecidability, 
with the aim of theoretically legitimating Wallaces endeavour to facilitate 
sincere affect (2017: 9, 10). The authors counter that this surreptitious project of 
theoretical legitimation must in fact come at the expense of undecidability: If the 
epistemological humility of Wallaces texts aims to generate a decision in favour 
of New Sincerity, then it is not undecidable (2017: 10). Despite my claims to the 
contrary, then, generating a decidable decision in favour of New Sincerity is what 
Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts see my work as really all about.
But what does to generate a decision in favour of New Sincerity actually 
mean? If it means to generate a decision in favour of sincere affect, then this seems 
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incoherent, since affect is not the result of a decision. If it means to generate a deci-
sion in favour of the authors sincerity, then this can hardly be the purpose of New 
Sincerity fiction. It is difficult to imagine why one would write fiction if convincing 
the reader of ones own sincerity was the prime motivation: it seems like a category 
error to treat the form in that way. Moreover, the whole point here is to question 
the possibility of understanding sincerity as a simple good. Even if one were some-
how to achieve sincerity, would this necessarily be a good thing? Would sinceritys 
effects always be good? And can good intentions ever be fully divorced from the 
consequences of actions?11 New Sincerity fiction is defined by the way it raises and 
scrutinises questions like these, not by the way it answers them in support of the 
imagined sincerity of the author. Amid the problems in Jackson and Nicholson-
Robertss argument here is their misunderstanding of the relationship between 
undecidability and calculation. Seemingly convinced that they are exposing the dark 
underbelly of my method, the authors contend that my reading elucidates an ele-
ment of Wallaces fiction wherein a seemingly undecidable moment is in fact highly 
determined and already calculated (2017: 11). But as the example of The Devil is a 
Busy Man demonstrates, there is in fact no opposition between undecidability and 
calculation. Calculation does not negate undecidability, but simply confronts us with 
its implacable quality at the structural heart of ethical concepts  sincerity, the gift 
 that orient our actions. This is not primarily a matter of affect, although Wallace 
certainly generates affect from it. Such affect is in turn described more accurately by 
the term anxiety rather than sincerity. Sincerity is something like the subject of 
these stories; anxiety is a good description of their form.
Yet perhaps this talk of form will not convince Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts, 
since formalism turns out to be among the charges they bring against my work. 
They claim that my employment of Derridean concepts serves to validate [my] own 
formalistic approach and enable [my] own formalism, which translates into a cul-
tural elitism (2017: 10, 3). I have already indicated why their aspersions of elitism are 
 11 This question lies at the heart of my analysis of Dana Spiottas New Sincerity novel Eat the Document 
in Kelly 2012b.
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unwarranted, but in order to address the formalist objection directly, I will conclude 
my response by gesturing more firmly to the historical dimension of New Sincerity 
writing. While a full historical account is evidently beyond my scope here, I want 
nonetheless to indicate how history contaminates the form of New Sincerity fiction, 
and how this contamination of form by history produces undecidability by repre-
senting the possibility of the future as both chance and threat.12 I also hope that 
concluding in this way can help to address what I believe to be the most fundamental 
error in Jackson and Nicholson-Robertss article, namely the authors misrepresenta-
tion of the role I posit for the reader of Wallaces fiction.
+LVWRU\&RQWDPLQDWLRQ5HDGLQJ
The move towards history can be made with the help of a recent essay by Lee 
Konstantinou, which aims to subsume both Hyde and Derrida into a larger, 
sociologically informed literary history of recent gift discourse (2016: 125). 
Konstantinou sets out to historicise Derridas concept of the impossible gift in order 
to highlight what in Hydes model might have proven so attractive to contemporary 
authors like Zadie Smith and Wallace. Rather than offer a political economic vision 
for a future gift economy, Hyde in The Gift emphasises the possibilities of the pre-
sent: he instead seeks to articulate the conditions of compatibility of capitalism and 
the gift economy for the individual artist. He defends the claim that the gift might 
endureeven thrivedespite the ubiquity of the calculating disposition that domi-
nates contemporary life (2016: 12627). On Konstantinous reading, influenced here 
by Pierre Bourdieu, Derridas image of the gift does not so much oppose this domi-
nant calculating disposition as participate in it. Derrida is taken to exemplify a par-
ticular vision of the gift that marks the waning days of the Cold War, after capitalisms 
 12 The language of chance and threat here derives from Martin Hägglunds Radical Atheism: Derrida 
and the Time of Life, generally taken to offer the most thorough available account of the logical basis 
of Derridas philosophy. Emphasising the temporal co-possibility of chance and threat, Hägglund 
defines undecidability as the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the 
future is strictly speaking undecidable since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any defini-
tive assurance or given meaning (2008: 40). Or elsewhere: undecidability elucidates what it means 
to think temporality as an irreducible condition (2008: 97).
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apparent global triumph (2016: 126). Against this historical background, the strict 
theoretical division Derrida appears to posit between gift and exchange becomes for 
contemporary authors an unhelpful economistic standard, a view whose aporetic 
habitus actively forestalls the possibility of the gift (2016: 125). Konstantinou thus 
sees the turn towards Hydes version of the gift as an attempt by writers to ward off 
the threat represented by Derridas model, which has in fact become identical with 
the threat of capitalist commodification. As he puts it: If you are a literary writer who 
has been told that the gift is necessarily contaminated by exchange relations (and, 
correspondingly, that pure literature is impossible), but you also suspect that such 
an argument could become an alibi for the spread of cynical reason, you might be 
tremendously interested in Hydes self-referential solution (2017: 127).
Konstantinous response to Hydes self-referential solution is to highlight its 
logical outcome for the writers psyche, with the lesson of The Gift turning out to be: 
Make your art in the gift-sphere, but when entering the marketplace, you had better 
find a good agent (2016a: 134). This opposition between the gift-giving creative art-
ist and the market-traversing literary agent gets re-imagined by contemporary writ-
ers as a division within the self, a way of protecting the artist side of the psyche from 
contamination by the agent side. Hyde brings us this far, but Konstantinou takes us 
further by introducing into this divisionwhich seems to preserve the gift as a purely 
positive forcethe insights of recent work on the creative economy that identifies the 
autonomous artist figure as the ideal neoliberal worker. Hydes account of the gift 
participates in the idealizing discourses of the artist-author, Konstantinou writes 
(2016a: 128), and as such the imagined split between pure creator and literary agent 
turns out to be unsatisfactory, because the pure creator side of the dichotomy cannot 
in fact escape the taint of neoliberal interpellation. You may think you are a pure cre-
atoror at least that part of you is a pure creatorbut what you actually are is a good 
neoliberal subject, an example of how one should love ones work and produce ones 
wares for a capitalist market that is indifferent to use value except as an indirect 
route to keeping labour costs down. Konstantinous analysis here presents a version 
of what has become familiar in contemporary scholarship as the neoliberal knot, 
whereby any imagined escape from the knot only ends up reinforcing neoliberal 
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entrapment at a higher level.13 The purity of artistic intention, then, becomes irre-
trievable in the face of contamination by capital, of commodification. Rather than 
embrace Hydes dispositional Third Way (2016a: 134), Konstantinou thinks that we 
should radically rethink our political and cultural institutions to counteract these 
forces of capitalism and commodification.
While I support this general proposal, my analysis nevertheless has a different 
emphasis. I want to see New Sincerity fiction less as an unwitting symptom of the 
problems Konstantinou identifies in Hydes model than as a determined struggle to 
respond to those very problems. In other words, fiction like Wallaces is highly self-
conscious not only about its own implication in a neoliberal logic, but also about 
the difficulty of diluting that implication by reverting to a division within the self 
whereby an autonomous creator could be separated off from a canny literary agent. 
While much of Wallaces non-fictional rhetoric might point towards the possibility of 
this separationIm thinking particularly of the well-known interview statements to 
Larry McCaffery on the differences between art and entertainment and on having 
the discipline to talk out of the part of yourself that can love instead of the part that 
just wants to be loved (1993: 148)Wallaces fiction tells a different, more anxious 
story, where the cross-contamination of love and money becomes the inescapable 
condition of writing in a neoliberal age. If New Sincerity fiction is sincere about any-
thing, it is this cross-contamination, this basic threat to a pure sincerity, in life and 
art. But the dialectical move on which New Sincerity is premised involves a decon-
struction of these two polesthe pure and the contaminatedso that the former is 
no longer the positively valued term. And it is here that the final piece of the puzzle, 
the reader, becomes crucial. The reader is the figure via whom purity and autonomy 
can be questioned, and contamination can be rethought as something not to be 
resisted but embraced.
 13 I borrow the phrase neoliberal knot from Jedediah Purdy (2014: 15), whose essay The Accidental 
Neoliberal offers a useful account of how this knot operated for would-be critics of neoliberalism 
during the pre-2008 period.
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It is the insights of deconstruction that allow us to see contamination not as an 
inherently negative trope, but as a necessary condition for existence. Contamination 
is not a privation or a lack of purity, writes Martin Hägglund in his account of 
Derridas work, it is the originary possibility for anything to be. Thus, a pure gift is 
not impossible because it is contaminated by our selfish intentions or by the con-
straints of economic exchange; it is impossible because a gift must be contaminated 
in order to be a gift (2008: 37). In New Sincerity fiction, the writer articulates a 
desire for contaminationthe very desire for a gift is a desire for contamination 
(2008: 37)by invoking a reader who can acknowledge and even co-produce the gift 
of writing. The key split in the authorial consciousness dramatised in these texts is 
therefore not between artist and agent, but between writer and reader. The reader 
becomes the internalised figure that can contaminate the pure autonomy of the 
writer, an autonomy that has come to serve an ideological function under neoliberal 
capitalism.14 This is a highly affective process, and the undecidability of the giftits 
haunting by debt and indebtednessaccounts for the fraught psychodynamics of 
the writer/reader relationship staged in New Sincerity fiction. The reader is consist-
ently imagined to represent a future beyond what the writer can anticipate, and 
thus to offer the only possible relief from solipsistic self-consciousness and neolib-
eral autonomy. But this relief is also a risk. In becoming the internalised figure of 
history beyond the endless neoliberal present, the reader figures the chance but also 
the threat of a future that can negate the self-interested gains made by the writer in 
that present.
 14 There is a broader argument heretaken up in the second chapter of my book-in-progressabout 
the function of the figures of purity and autonomy for neoliberal ideology. On the one hand, the 
neoliberal subject is imagined (originally in Gary Beckers work) as autonomous in the sense of own-
ing their personal feelings and having responsibility for their personal wellness, and acting in an 
entrepreneurial fashion so that all the gains of their actions return to themselves. On the other hand, 
the market is imagined (in Friedrich Hayeks vision) as a spontaneous social aggregator that allows 
for the pure articulation of preferences and the frictionless movement of capital to feed those pref-
erences, with financialisation instituting a temporal logic in which the future is imagined as a pure 
product of the present. Underlying both of these dimensions is a faith in economics as a pure and dis-
interested science. In Bourdieus summary, neoliberal discourse imagines that the economic world is 
a pure and perfect order, implacably unrolling the logic of its predictable consequences (1998).
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This is the historical situation in which the impossibility and undecidability at 
the heart of New Sincerity fiction open themselves up to being read dialectically, 
as expressive of a deep impasse. With this in mind, where Jackson and Nicholson-
Roberts err most in their article is in assuming that my articulation of the role of 
the reader imagined by Wallaces texts is coextensive with the role of actual readers 
of those texts. If this were somehow the case, then Wallaces fiction could indeed 
be accused of coercing its readers into adopting a decidable outlookburden[ing] 
readers with responsibilities, as Mark McGurl has it in his critique of Wallace (2014: 
42). Presuming that this is the model of reading I have in mind, the authors try to 
show that my conception of undecidability is a ruse, and that I am in fact working 
in league with Wallace to coerce the reader into accepting his sincerity. But Jackson 
and Nicholson-Roberts are wrong in their implied assumption that I see the role 
imagined for the reader by New Sincerity fiction as a liberatory one, or one that the 
reader should be eager to take up. Rather, my argument is that this is the reader that 
New Sincerity texts must imagine in the historical situation in which they are written: in 
other words, the reader of these texts is positioned as the writers necessary other, 
because the vertiginous self-consciousness that attends the writing of fiction in the 
neoliberal age structurally requires an other to relieve it of its burdens. This other 
must represent a future that goes beyond the limitations of the determining hori-
zons of the present of writing. Highlighting structures of undecidability in his fiction 
therefore becomes Wallaces way of gesturing to an outside to the historical situation 
in which he finds himself, without fully pre-empting  as neoliberal capitalism tries 
to do  what the future may hold. It is the imagined reader who is called on to decide 
on and in this future, as the famous closing imperative of Octet makes explicit.15
How the actual reader responds to a New Sincerity text is of course a different 
matter to how that text imagines its reader. In my work, I do implicitly propose a role 
for the reader of New Sincerity texts, but it is hardly the passive and constricted one 
assumed by Jackson and Nicholson-Robertss critique. Rather, it is a critical role that 
 15 For a brief overview of the way New Sincerity fictions so often end with pleas and questions to an 
imagined reader, see Kelly 2016.
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struggles to establish the historical distance from neoliberal norms that the texts 
themselves find so hard to imagine. This imaginative difficulty is figured not only 
in direct appeals to the reader for dialogue and decision, but in the common motif 
of evacuating conscious intention from the subject who acts. This is a motif I have 
explored in my most recent published work on New Sincerity, a chapter in the first 
edited collection on George Saunders.16 Discussing the dramatised escape from con-
sciousness that concludes so many of Saunderss stories, I attempt to articulate the 
general meaning of this motif in a formulation that I think it makes sense to quote 
here in bringing this response to a close:
But this escapelike the escapes from consciousness that structure, in vary-
ing ways, the imaginaries of novels like Jennifer Egans Look at Me (2001), 
Dave Eggerss You Shall Know Our Velocity (2002), Benjamin Kunkels 
Indecision (2005), and Colson Whiteheads Apex Hides the Hurt (2006)
should not be taken as a positive recommendation or prescription for action 
in a neoliberal world. Gestures such as these in contemporary US fiction 
must instead be read both criticallyas informed by skepticism of earlier 
modernist solutions offered through an emphasis on individual conscious-
nessand dialectically, as an admission of uncertainty about actual feeling 
and actual solutions, as a symptom of the imaginative limits imposed by the 
dominance of neoliberal capitalism and the end of history in these writers 
time and our own. In this way, New Sincerity writing frames the outlines of a 
political project, albeit one not fully articulated but waiting to be taken up, 
as Zadie Smith has put it, off the page, outside words. As has always been 
the case, then, these writers in their time can frame the questions. It is up 
to us, the readers of the present and future, to find the answers. (2017a: 54)
 16 It is also a motif alluded to in Severss discussion of the gift in his book on Wallace, which deserves 
far more engagement than I am able to offer here: people do it, people give, and one path to being 
sincere and generous for Wallace seems to lie in remaining absorbed in work and not recognizing a 
need to avow an intention at all (2017: 121). 
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The point for the critical reader of these fictions, the reader who moves from 
participating in the texts own imaginary to articulating a critical position on the 
text, is not to inhabit continuously an undecidable moment, but to read that 
moment dialectically as expressing a form of historically situated contradiction. 
This is the direction in which my formalism points: this is the historical inter-
articulation of neoliberalism and the New Sincerity. In a final irony, it is in fact 
Jackson and Nicholson-Roberts who evacuate historical context from their 
approach, particularly when it comes to considering the questions of race and 
gender over the second half of their article. But substantiating this point, and 
thereby addressing their critique of Wallaces work rather than my own, is a task 
that will have to wait for another day.
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